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Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the
Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural
Justice - Some Observations and
Questions of an Emerging
Phenomenon
Gerald Torres*
[C]onsider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bear-
ings, we conceive the object of our conception to have Then, our con-
ception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
- C.S. Peirce
1
No particular results then, so far, but only an attitude of orienta-
tion, is what the pragmatic method means. The attitude of looking
away from first things, principles, "categories," supposed necessities;
and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts.'...
[TheJ pragmatist talks about truths in the plural ....
- W. James
2
My single mistake has been to seek an identity with any one person or
nation or with any part of history.... What I see now, on this rainy
day in January, 1968, what is clear to me after this sojourn is that I
am neither a Mesican nor an American. I am neither a Catholic nor
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Visiting Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School. This Essay is based on a talk given at the 1991 Confer-
ence of the Association of American Law Schools. Many of the themes in this
Essay remain to be developed.
1. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, in VALUES IN A UNIVERSE OF
CHANCE 124 (1958).
2. James, What Pragmatism Means, in PRAGMATISM: THE CLASSIC
WRITINGS, 209, 214, 220 (H. Thayer, ed. 1970). Compare this formulation with
that suggested by E.P. Thompson:
But outside the university precincts another kind of knowledge-
production is going on all the time. I will agree that it is not always
rigorous. I am not careless of intellectual values nor unaware of the
difficulty of their attainment. But I must remind a Marxist philoso-
pher that knowledges have been and still are formed outside the aca-
demic procedures. Nor have these been, in the test of practice,
negligible. They have assisted men and women to till the fields, to
construct houses, to support elaborate social organizations, and even,
on occasion, to challenge effectively the conclusions of academic
thought.
E.P. THOMPSON, THE POVERTY OF THEORY & OTHER ESSAYS 8 (1978).
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a Protestant. I am a Chicano by ancestry and a Brown Buffalo by
choice.
- O.Z. Acosta3
Think about justice. When I say the word "justice," how do
you understand it? Do you conceive of it as representing a sin-
gle thing? How is your conception of justice formed? What
stands behind your conception of justice? What background
highlights the features of your conception of justice? I think it
important to start by questioning our conceptions of justice be-
cause doing so highlights both the difficulty and importance of
my task. That task is to demonstrate that at least two of the
goals of the civil rights movement may be incompatible, at least
as they are commonly understood.
The claim for justice at the heart of the civil rights move-
ment had moral force because it was the demand for a single
thing: that differently situated people be treated fairly and
equally.4 But our allegiance to pluralism, a concept implicit in
the mapping of our political universe, may equally be loyalty to
a single thing. Justice, as it has taken concrete form in our civil
rights jurisprudence, may require a weak form of pluralism, or
a strong form of pluralism may require many kinds of justice.
Pluralism is the concept that has come to define culture
and ethnicity within our legal system. Pluralism is not a
"thing," however, but an approach to politics and, through poli-
tics, law. According to at least one version of our political
story, the evolution of our law reflects the continued moral
progress of our society.5 To the extent that the law also re-
flects at least one version of the social consensus on justice, the
moral progress also reflects an evolution towards a more just
society. Because our society not only projects our culture but
also expresses and creates it, we would expect evolving notions
of cultural pluralism to be reproduced in politics and in law.
3. O.Z. ACOSTA, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A BROWN BUFFALO 199 (1972).
Compare Acosta's vision with that of Richard Rodriguez in R. RODRIQUEZ,
THE HUNGER OF MEMORY: THE EDUCATION OF RICHARD RODRIGUEZ 28-40, 58-
73 (1982).
4. I recognize that this characterization is unfair to the complexity of the
civil rights movement, but it does capture the essence of the initial claim for
"equal rights" as citizens. I realize many in the civil rights movements articu-
lated "justice" as more than the call for equality of opportunity; it was also the
call for a more transformative elimination of all the socially constructed barri-
ers to equal results. See, e.g., Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758
(1990).
5. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
19 (1978); G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 4, 101-04 (1977).
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Particularity may be celebrated but, in keeping with James and
Peirce, the question remains just what is being celebrated. My
premise is that "community,"' 6 characterized as "democratic
pluralism," has become the conceptual link between competing
particularities and the existence (or hoped for existence) of a
universal social, political, economic and "ethnic" American Cul-
ture. The deployment of "community" as a substitute for "cul-
tural pluralism" within the structure of existing political
discourse has the effect of denying cultural differences by de-
fining pluralism as a purely political category.
An initial question, then, is what is the difference between
cultural pluralism and political pluralism? In the context of
contemporary political discourse, cultural pluralism does not
exist outside the realm of a cultural difference that is expressed
in terms of interest groups or as a marginalized non-threaten-
ing other. Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder and the Reverend
Jesse Jackson have demonstrated that culturally subordinated
people can only have their interests heard by collapsing the
broader goals of "cultural liberation," as haltingly expressed in
the civil rights movement, into the structure of major party in-
terest group coalition building. The recent re-election cam-
paign of North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms demonstrated
that, to secure a polity free from the voice of the dispossessed,
all that is needed is to raise the specter of an alien threatening
other.7 Thus, political pluralism, as currently understood, has
no room for the full expression of the culturally distinct needs
6. Community refers here to the idealized polity within which differ-
ences are regulated by reference to a common understanding of the general
good. Community as a virtue shows up in the current literature surrounding
"civic republicanism" and in the dialogic left. See Delgado, Zero-Based Racial
Politics: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case Arguments on Behalf of the Non-
White Underclass, 78 GEoRGETowN L.J. 1929, 1937-39 (1990); infra notes 12-13.
7. Newspaper accounts of Senator Helms's stump speeches, alleging that
his opponent Harvey Gantt was fundraising in the bars of San Francisco, com-
bined with his television advertisement suggesting that quotas would deny de-
serving white men of their jobs created an electoral climate of "us versus
them," with very little question about who the "them" was. The television ad-
vertisement was captured well in this report:
In the TV spot, the camera focused in on the hands of a white
man wearing a wedding ring crumpling up what is apparently a job
rejection letter.
As dramatic music played in the background a voice said: "You
needed that job. And you were the best qualified. But they had to
give it to a minority because of a racial quota. Is that really fair?
Harvey Gantt says it is. Gantt supports Ted Kennedy's racial quota
law that makes the color of your skin more important than your
qualifications."
1991]
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of subordinate groups. Those groups only have expression to
the extent that they translate their needs into the language of
"interests." By restricting the claims of subordinate groups to
"interests," political discussion on the construction of "the
good" is severely limited. "The good," as the term is commonly
used, refers to the construction of the context within which
rights (and thus first order interests) may be asserted and con-
tested. By constraining a reconstruction of "the good," "inter-
ests" will continue to be defined in terms congenial to the
continued domination by those who control the distribution of
social goods.8 The technique is formal neutrality as to "inter-
ests." Thus, according to this understanding, both procedural
and normative barriers exist in contemporary political dis-
course to the inclusion of those who would seriously destabilize
the current distribution of political power.
The "cultural nationalism" that emerged toward the end of
the resurgent mass civil rights movement was an attempt to
construct an antagonistic cultural foundation that would facili-
tate the assertion of claims by those whose "interests" were
first given voice within the context of "civil rights." Stokely
Carmichael (now known as Kwame Toure), one of the original
proponents of Black Power, put it this way:
"Integration" as a goal today speaks to the problem of blackness
not only in an unrealistic way but also in a despicable way.... [It]
reinforces, among both black and white, the idea that "white" is auto-
matically superior and "black" is by definition inferior....
"Integration" also means that black people must give up their
identity, deny their heritage.... The fact is that integration, as tradi-
tionally articulated, would abolish the black community. The fact is
that what must be abolished is not the black community but the de-
pendent colonial status that has been inflicted upon it.9
Cultural nationalism thus opposed civil rights as a definition of
the political program that subordinate groups should follow.
Mandel, Quotas: A Potent but Perilous Political Issue, Investor's Daily, Nov.
23, 1990, at 32, col. 1. Gantt opposed job quotas.
A Washington Post editorial noted:
In the closing days of his campaign, Helms appealed not only to
racism but to homophobia as well. He accused his opponent, Harvey
Gantt, of accepting money from gay groups - funds raised, Helms
said, in gay bars. "Why are homosexuals buying this election for Har-
vey Gantt?" a Helms newspaper ad asked....
Cohen, Helms the Hater, Wash. Post, Nov. 8, 1990, at A31, col. 1.
8. "[Ihe right to decide what is true is not independent of the right to
decide what is just." J. LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE 8 (1984).
9. S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAImiLTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLTICS OF LIB-
ERATION IN AMERICA 54-55 (1967).
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Those within conventional political discourse perceived as
deeply threatening the idea that groups want to participate in
the social life of the "nation," yet stand aloof from the demands
that differentiating characteristics be discarded. We saw the re-
sponse to the threat in the state sanctioned violence that was
meted out against black people and native people, and we con-
tinue to see it today in the "English only" movement. The in-
choate cultural nationalism of that age might be understood as
a response of members of a group who were the objects rather
than the subjects of social change.
By declaring that a cultural foundation was necessary for
the political changes that were proposed during the struggle
against Jim Crow, elements within the civil rights movement
attempted to articulate the notion that recognition and preser-
vation of group membership is important to community build-
ing and to the creation of justice. "Justice is neither a term of
explanation nor of classification, but of experience."'' 0 The ex-
perience of justice is not just a residue, however, but the sense
that we have participated in the system that both defines and
creates it.
This construction raises the critical question of how these
concepts of cultural and political pluralism differ from mere in-
terest-group pluralism? Is group integrity essential to the pro-
cess of the creation and definition of a just society?" As Frank
Michelman,' 2 among others,'3 has demonstrated in his recent
work, both the republican ideal (as reconstituted in the "new
civic republicanism") and the strongly liberal-pluralist strains
in American political consciousness start from an unstated, but
common assumption: that the definition of citizenship presup-
poses a general, as opposed to particular, will and that this gen-
erality requires that the law be blind to group interests, at least
where the group is smaller than the nation and where recogniz-
ing the "subgroup's" legitimacy risks undermining the solidar-
ity of the state. I do not mean to understate the tension
10. Torres & Brewster, Judges and Juries: Separate Moments in the
Same Phenomenon, 4 LAW & INEQUALrrY 171, 187 (1986).
11. See Kymlicka, Liberalism, Individualism, and Minority Rights, in
LAw AND THE CoMMUNrrY: THE END OF INDVIDUALISM? 181 (1989); Torres &
Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee In-
dian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 654-59.
12. See Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitu-
tional Argument Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REv. 443, 445-47 (1989).
13. See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,
1555-58, 1569 (1988); Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713,
1714, 1716 (1988).
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between republicanism of either the new or old variety and lib-
eral-pluralism with this characterization.
This common assumption has two very broad implications
for politics and law. First, our identity (and thus our interests)
is rooted in some broad culture defined by the political con-
tours of our present nation state. Second, to the extent that
there are contests over that identity and shares of goods that
are distributed socially, we define ourselves in terms of shifting
interest groups. These interest groups are largely affiliational.
We choose to commit to them or not. Mostly, however, we do
not.14 Even groups based on filiation are either redefined to fit
the affiliational model or marginalized. 15
The interest-group model of politics is based upon an es-
sentially privatized contractual model of social life within the
context of a dominant political ethos. The ethos might be de-
fined as the general commitment to public fair play. Each un-
differentiated citizen must be treated like every other, and we
all have the opportunity to affiliate in order to exercise state
power to our advantage within constitutionally defined bounda-
ries. Within the procedurally defined boundaries of "fair play,"
however, affiliated citizens struggle through the representation
of their interest to achieve the maximum benefit regardless of
the social cost. The theory obviously encompasses cost shifting
as a major strategy. Since the cipher-citizen can shift from alli-
ance to alliance as opportunity and need present themselves,
costs will only weigh most heavily on those who are unpersua-
sive and choose to remain in a losing arrangement. Both the
pressures of the republican model and of the liberal-pluralist
interest group model aim to strip unimportant features like
race or ethnicity or gender from the definition of citizen-
participant.
Interest group pluralism begins from these premises.
Under this view, as Iris Young puts it, "Friends of the Whales,
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple, the National Rifle Association, and the National Freeze
Campaign all have the same status, and each influences deci-
sionmaking to the degree that their resources and ingenuity
can win out in the competition for policymakers' ears.' 6 The
14. Take, for example, the pejorative content in conventional political dis-
course of the phrase "Special Interests."
15. Useful examples are the Sons of Italy or the Black Panthers. Discus-
sions with Kendall Thomas have been very helpful on this point.
16. Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Uni-
versal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 266 (1989).
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main effort of the opponents of the Civil Rights Movement is to
characterize the movement for "equal rights" as just another
special interest group. This restructuring of the debate both de-
bases the nature of the claims that have evolved in the civil
rights struggle and disguises the efforts of "racial management"
that characterizes current state policy toward minority
groups. 17
My view of cultural/political pluralism starts from a differ-
ent premise. Turn again to Iris Young for a preliminary state-
ment, but remember her definition here is still one of political
rather than cultural pluralism:
By an interest group I mean any aggregate or association of persons
who seek a part.cular goal, or desire the same policy, or are similarly
situated with respect to some social effect - for example, they are all
recipients of acid rain caused by Ohio smokestacks. Social groups usu-
ally share some interests, but shared interests are not sufficient to
constitute a social group. A social group is a collective of people who
have affinity with one another because of a set of practices or way of
life; they differentiate themselves from or are differentiated by at
least one other group according to these cultural forms.1 8
The basic idea is that cultural groupings, as I have defined
them elsewhere,19 may have distinct interests in common, but it
is not those interests that define them. To reduce those group-
ings to the political expression of their interests in the sense
Young uses is to debase the culture that supports and identifies
the group. Thus, to say that a cultural subgrouping is merely
an interest group is to assume from the outset that the political
expression of the groups' cultural life captures the essence of
the collectivity and defines any particular member of the group.
Such a move, of course, protects the dominant cultural group-
ing from confronting a destabilizing "other," and forces the
subordinate group to adopt the dominant groups' definition of
themselves if they wish to share in the distribution of social
goods. This process, while structurally concealing the transla-
tion at work, formally provides "groups" with a model of par-
ticipation in the discourse of the polity. Under this model,
however, it is a discourse of exclusion.
To the extent that the above description captures in a sche-
matic fashion the complexity of the social relations that have
produced the specific historical forms that "pluralism" has
17. See Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and
the Law of Race Relations, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1043, 1062-68 (1988).
18. I. M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 186 (1990).
19. See Torres, supra note 17, at 1061-66.
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taken, specific attention must be paid to the ideological struc-
tures that mask systemic domination and subordination. Any
theorizing about structures of domination and subordination
must recognize that no system is a seamless web. Every system
is a living system composed of actors engaged in the construc-
tion of "everyday life." Any analysis of "cultural pluralism" as
a potentially viable form of political pluralism must recognize
the oppositional content of everyday resistance. Much of this
resistance will be partial and found in the marginal spaces of
the dominant culture and society. Mere marginality must not
be valorized as such, however, since the margins may be where
resistance occurs, but marginality is not resistance in itself.
For the benefits of marginality to be reaped, marginality must in
some sense be chosen. Even if, in one's own individual history, one
experiences one's patterns of desire as given and not chosen, one may
deny, resist, tolerate or embrace them. One can choose a way of life
which is devoted to changing them, disguising oneself or escaping the
consequences of difference, or a way of life which takes on one's dif-
ference as integral to one's stance and location in the world. If one
takes the route of denial and avoidance, one cannot take difference as
a resource. One cannot see what is to be seen from one's particular
vantage point or know what can be known to a body so located if one
is preoccupied with wishing one were not there, denying the peculiar-
ity of one's position, disowning oneself.20
To remain critical, however, theorizing about pluralism or mar-
ginality must remain rooted in an historically specific practice
and must reject the notion of the representative intellectual.21
No theory can be applied without modification to the field of
study for which it was constructed, since the objects of that
study are constantly creating ways of knowing and patterns of
being. A critical theory will accept the notion that various au-
tonomous and competing groups will have to cooperate in ways
that support the integrity of the various groups within the pol-
ity without using the concept of polity to collapse real differ-
ences. These competing groups will be both cultural, in a broad
20. M. FRYE, THE PoLrrIcs OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 149-
50 (1983).
21. Questions about the role of the intellectual in social movements has a
history dating at least back to Marx. Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci devel-
oped the idea of "organic intellectuals," who viewed themselves not as mem-
bers of a separate, detached, reflective community, but who were instead
intimately linked to the social class from which they came. This connection
informed their intellectual work. For a version of this analysis in the legal
context, see Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 7, 7-10 (1989) and Matsuda,
Looking to The Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324-26, 362-63 (1987).
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sense, and political, in a narrow sense. Recreating a theory of
pluralism will entail escaping the decentering and deculturizing
nature of conventional contemporary pluralism. Theorizing
must reject the idea of a trans-historical subject of politics.
The struggle is against domination and for autonomy and
thus a theory must specify each without privileging a specific
version by reference to a trans-historical subject. Resistance at
the margin is never "for itself," because the specific actors are
never "for themselves" as historical individuals, but are linked
with others and the others define the individual. Nonidentity is
presumed in identity, the subject and the object are always one.
Difference within the subject is never overcome or suspended.
Difference is merely repressed through social and discursive
power. Looking at the idea of equality illustrates this point.
Equality has been interpreted in our law as sameness:
those who are similarly situated should be treated similarly; the
same things should be treated the same.22 This construction,
while formally attractive, submerges much that is both inter-
esting and important about the question of equality. It trans-
forms similarity into sameness. Equality, as the post-
modernists3 have shown us, has at least two important mean-
ings for the law. First, there is the idea of identity: These
things (or people, or situations) are the same; therefore, they
should be treated the same. (This construction is contained
within the ideal of universal citizenship.) Second, is the idea of
equivalence: In some important respects - that is, from an in-
tersubjective perspective - these two things or these two peo-
ple are sufficiently similar to require equivalent treatment.
Equivalence does not require identical treatment, but requires
that treatment take into specific account the subject's
particularity.2
22. See, e.g., Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537,
539-40 (1982).
23. For an interesting discussion and critique of post-modernism, see D.
HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNrrY (1989).
24. See, e.g., C. MACKiNNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 37 (1987):
I will also concede that there are many differences between wo-
men and men. I mean, can you imagine elevating one half of a popu-
lation and denigrating the other half and producing a population in
which everyone is the same? What the sameness standard fails to no-
tice is that men's differences from women are equal to women's dif-
ferences from men. There is an equality there. Yet the sexes are not
socially equal. The difference approach misses the fact that hierarchy
of power produces real as well as fantasied differences, differences
that are also inequalities. What is missing in the difference approach
is what Aristotle missed in his empiricist notion that equality means
1991] 1001
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The term "post-modernism" has been used to express dis-
may over the collapse of modernism, as well as to express hope
over the decline of totalizing modes of description and explana-
tion. The post-modern critique begins with the admonition to
guard against attempts to ground value in any foundationalist
or basic normative conception like humanity, nature, or reason.
Post-modern theorists insist on the local contingency of value.
One way out of the problem of contingency is to adopt a posi-
tion that grounds value in "interpretive communities."2s Main-
taining the integrity of local communities of meaning grounds
the intellectual within the social needs of the community.26
Jean-Francois Lyotard, a central figure in the current de-
bate over post-modernism, contrasts the "grand narratives"
that attempt to unify all of human history within the story of
emancipation (the promise of the Enlightenment and the
French and American Revolutions) with the language games
that control the interpretive integrity of local communities.27
Lyotard, in exploring the "differend,"2s looks to those situa-
tions where power and language intersect. As he puts it:
"[Every] phrase, even the most ordinary one, is constituted ac-
cording to a set of rules (its regimen).... Phrases from hetero-
geneous regimens cannot be translated from one into the
other. '29 Pretending that they can be translated with no dam-
treating likes alike and unlikes unlike, and nobody has questioned it
since. Why should you have to be the same as a man to get what a
man gets simply because he is [a man]? Why does maleness provide
an original entitlement, not questioned on the basis of its gender, so
that it is women - women who want to make a case of unequal treat-
ment in a world men have made in their image (this is really the part
Aristotle missed) - who have to show in effect that they are men in
every relevant respect, unfortunately mistaken for women on the ba-
sis of an accident of birth?
25. S. FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 303-21 (1980).
26. See, e.g., R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989). For
a critical review of Rorty's project, see West, The Politics of American Neo-
Pragmatism, in POsT-ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 259 (1985).
27. J. LYOTARD, supra note 8, at 23-27.
28. Lyotard defines "the differend" as "a case of conflict, between (at
least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judg-
ment applicable to both arguments." J. LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND xi (1988).
29. Id. at xii. "Phrase" is defined this way:
Phrase: ... the English cognate has been used throughout rather than
the semantically more correct sentence for a number of reasons. The
term, as Lyotard develops it here, is not a grammatical - or even a
linguistic - entity (it is not the expression of one complete thought
nor the minimal unit of signification), but a pragmatic one, the con-
cern being with the possibility (or impossibility) of what can (or can-
not) be "phrased," of what can (or cannot) be "put into phrases." ...
A phrase is defined by - as it, in fact, defines - the situating of its
1002 [Vol. 75:993
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age to the structure of meaning underlying the disputes is to
presume the legitimacy of one perspective and the illegitimacy
of the other. More than that, however, where cultural differ-
ences are at stake, the definition of the local community is cen-
tral. An attempt to universalize the narrative by universalizing
cultural discourse suspends the capacity of the subordinate
group even to argue for their exclusion.30 He notes that "[a]
case of differend between two parties takes place when the
'regulation' of the conflict that opposes them is done in the id-
iom of one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other
is not signified in that idiom."3' Lyotard distrusts the "integ-
rity of interpretive communities" as much as the "tendency to-
ward totalizing explanation." 32
By constituting themselves as separate "language games,"33
the various and competing spheres of cultural knowledge seek
to maintain their autonomy and explanatory power. The func-
tion of these language games is to keep cultural values from in-
fecting the separate realms of politics and economics and to
disguise the pervasive role of power in the various realms of
cultural discourse.34 An attempt to de-culturalize a discourse is
an attempt to understand the conceptions within that discourse
as "pure." This purity is a resurrection of the claim to a univer-
salizing (or totalizing) explanatory power within a distinct or,
at least, relatively autonomous realm.35 To struggle against the
power displaced in language games that disguise the differend
is to struggle against what Gramsci called the hegemony of eve-
ryday life through which social and economic relations are en-
forced, amplified and contested.36 Lyotard recognizes that this
process is part of the practice of politics. We live our lives in a
series of separate realities and in each one of those spaces a spe-
instances (addressor, addressee, referent, sense) with regard to one
another. Rather than defining a grammatical or semantic unit, a
phrase designates a particular constellation of instances, which is as
contextual as it is textual - if it is not indeed precisely what renders
the "opposition" between text and context impertinent.
. at 194.
30. See id at 157.
31. See id. at 9.
32. See J. LYOTARD, supra note 8, at 11-41 (discussing the strengths and
weaknesses inherent in each model of knowledge).
33. Id at 62.
34. Id. at 64.
35. See id. at 62.
36. Gamsci's notion of hegemony is discussed in Lears, The Concept of
Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities, 90 AM. HiSm. REv. 567, 568-71
(1985).
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cific kind of politics is possible. The multiple possibilities for
action across different discursive realms is a direct refutation of
the notion that there is a single sense of politics or single stra-
tegic political idea.
Constituting the post-modern in opposition to the modem
or to the metaphysical is a counter-hegemonic act.37 It is an op-
positional practice. The ensemble of social and linguistic rela-
tions that constituted the "modern" acted to mask social
difference. Yet, if theorizing the post-modem is to constitute a
counter-hegemonic activity, then it must be done with a clear
understanding of the historical specificity of our own cultural
practices and with the aim of bringing the practices of our disci-
pline in line with oppositional forces in society that are strug-
gling against the various forms of cultural domination. How do
we transform our practices and what will post-modem legal
theorizing look like? Lyotard would suggest that the answers
to those questions cannot be pre-determined. However, until
critics of the dominant discourse position themselves within the
structures they hope to transform, they cannot hope even to
identify the differend or to respond to the totalizing impulses of
every specific language game. Thus, current "theory" is neces-
sarily inadequate to the task, especially if it locates itself within
a universalizing story of emancipation. For example, Marxism
37. Hegemony is a term with a complicated lineage and it is often used in
contradictory ways. In the sense that I mean it here, hegemony might usefully
be compared to Lyotard's idea of terror. Lyotard argues that:
Within the framework of the power criterion, a request (that is a
form of prescription) gains nothing in legitimacy by virtue of being
based on the hardship of an unmet need. Rights do not flow from
hardship, but from the fact the alleviation of hardship improves the
system's performance. The needs of the most underprivileged should
not be used as a system regulator as a matter of principle: since the
means of satisfying them is already known, their actual satisfaction
will not improve the system's performance, but only increase its ex-
penditures. The only counterindication is that not satisfying them can
destabilize the whole. It is against the nature of force to be ruled by
weakness....
Such behavior is terrorist .... By terror I mean the efficiency
gained by eliminating, or threatening to eliminate, a player from the
language game one shares with him. He is silenced or consents, not
because he has been refuted, but because his ability to participate has
been threatened (there are many ways to prevent someone from play-
ing). The decision makers' arrogance, which in principle has no
equivalent in the sciences, consists in the exercise of terror. It says:
"Adapt your aspirations to our ends - or else."
J. LyoTARD, supra note 8, at 62-64 (footnotes omitted).
A counter-hegemonic act resides in the destabilization of the system that
excludes the "unmet need."
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is inadequate not just because it has failed materially in East-
ern Europe, but because it partook of the oppressive ideal of a
single historical subject. No single ruling discourse of social life
or autonomy is possible or even desirable.
To argue that pluralism requires multiplicity of voices for
liberation to remain relatively autonomous seems to invite
ch~os. But to reject that conception in favor of some version of
homogeneity is a nostalgic and totalizing vision. Multiplicity
implies a decentralized ideology and economy and, ultimately, a
non-hierarchical culture. Yet, this post-modern vision is not
one that suggests either the pure determinism of culture nor
the pure autonomy of voluntary association. Post-modernism
requires building from the micro-politics of opposition to an op-
position that can challenge the extant distribution of power, but
not to establish an alternative hegemonic structure. A post-
modern discourse of justice rejects that as a goal. Theory does
not precede ideology and thus the eclecticism of theory mirrors
the historical specificity of the project of building a post-mod-
ern politics. This is one of the problems that Lyotard con-
fronted as a form of both "narrative solidarity" and
"essentialism."
Marilyn Frye, in The Politics of Reality, reports enjoining
men to think about how to stop being men, and when thinking
about her whiteness she enjoins herself to stop being white.3
Yet how does one stop being "white" -or how does a man stop
being a "man"? Frye's remonstration highlights the problem in
any theory of pluralism: filiation versus affiliation both for be-
ing and for action. Her injunction also throws into relief Ly-
otard's notion of the determinative power of narrative
structures. There are groups to which we belong or, perhaps
more descriptively, into which we are thrown. A mere act of
will cannot disaffiliate us from these groups. Even our attempt
to hold ourselves apart merely reconfirms our membership.3 9
To take Frye's categories as examples, a man is both male
biologically described, and male socially described. Every man
is a member of both groups. Feminists like Frye and Professor
38. M. FRYE, supra note 20, at 127.
39. See, e.g., S. STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER 70-75, 93-109
(1990) (discussing the conflict between racial and individual aspects of identity
and tension between raceless class values and patterns of racial identity);
Carter, The Best Black, 1 RECONsTRucION 6, 7 (1990) (discussing the "Best
Black" syndrome that sets some blacks apart from the rest of their culture, yet
reinforces their membership).
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Catharine MacKinnon 4° distinguish between the two categories
and argue that the socially constructed category "male" de-
scribes a fully articulated view of the world and the subject's
place in it. Short of a sex-change operation, the biological de-
terminant remains unchangeable, but it does not determine the
social content of maleness. Biologically and culturally, men are
thrown into the category "male." To "stop being a man," in the
sense that Frye intends, means critically to evaluate the privi-
leges and political views and positions that are attendant to the
role. Yet it also means to understand politics as a man. From
this perspective a "male" can choose to act in ways that rein-
force structures of privilege and domination or he can oppose
them, but he cannot escape his grouping with other men. Simi-
larly, when Frye struggles with racism from the perspective of
her whiteness she can reject the impulse to act in ways that re-
inforce the privilege of "whiteness," but she must do so from
the perspective that her situation entails.41 The quotation from
Acosta at the beginning of this Essay states in very personal
terms the conflict and promise in recognizing how we can con-
vert filiation into affiliational terms; it also illustrates the prob-
lem of the differend.4
The determinative power of narrative structures arises
when either one or the other definition of group structure and
membership is given priority. Among the practical problems
facing Critical Race Theory or Critical Pluralist Theory is how
to regulate the conflicting idioms in a way that does not depend
upon a universalizing norm or vision of the good.43 These theo-
rists need to reform conceptions of democratic representation
in a way that supports the underlying legitimizing justifications
of democracy without systematically repressing the capacity for
minority self-determination. There must be strong democratic
support for group difference and, from those differences, com-
plex equalities. The interest group model of representation de-
scribed fails in this task. A pure majoritarian model would also
40. C. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 54-55.
41. See, e.g., Peller, supra note 4, at 839-40 (discussing psychological forces
driving white progressives and liberals to advocate integration).
42. See supra text accompanying note 31.
43. Linda Hirschman, in an interesting article, The Virtue of Liberality
in American Communal Life, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 983 (1990), struggles with the
"pre-modern" foundations for defining the good. Id at 998-1002. In doing so,
she attempted to construct redistributist claims within the context of existing
American culture. Id at 1011-22. Her explication of the good life remains res-
olutely flexible within the redistributist ideal.
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fail where it does not give weight to culturally specific defini-
tions of the good.
I began by asking whether justice could be conceived of in
the plural. In this Essay, I have tried to suggest why, by and
large, the answer has been no. The answer has been "no" be-
cause of the assumption that all cultural differences that mat-
ter are either outside the idiom of politics or else are
convertible into the form of interest group discourse that re-
presses differences that matter. The dilemma is tragic and old.
The tragic consists of a legal double bind. Antigone, Creon, Oedipus,
Agamemnon, Eteocles - all owe allegiance to both the edicts of their
city and to the customs of their family lineage. Living under this
tragic double bind is unbearable, which is why each of them chose his
or her univocal law... Their denial of the conflicting law proves
however hubristic.4 4
44. Shurmann, A Brutal Awakening to the Tragic Condition of Being- On
Heidegger's Beitrage zur Philosophie, in Art, Politics, and Technology: Martin
Heidegger 1889-1989 an International Colloquium at Yale (K. Harries ed. 1992)
(forthcoming).
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